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IN TIJE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
- - - - - - - - - -
~OE .s. VALDEZ, 
' 
Appellant, 
Case No. 11352 
-vs-
jS1ATE OF UTAH, 
Respondento 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ----
STATEViENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
~ Joe s. Valdez, the appellant, was convicted of the 
' '.rime of assault with a deadly weapon and of being an 
r,Jbi tu al criminal, in the District Court of Weber County, 
5t:;te of Utah, in December, 1966. State v. Valdez, 19 Utah 
:dv6; 432 P.2d 53 (1967). Subsequent thereto he applied 
rr)r a writ of coram nobis to obtain a new trialo He 
':~euls from the denial of the complaint for coram nobis. 
DISPOSITIOH IJJ THE LOWER COURT 
A li•'3ring on appellant's complaint for a writ of 
· _, iF>lJis was had on the 19th day of April, 1968, in 
.c District C.ourt of Salt Lake County, before the Honorable 
T,:r·.ri::ird w. El ton, Judge. The purpose of the hearing was 
: _ ~2 termine whether r:ew evidence discovered since appell-
ont-' s original trial warranted a new trial being granted. 
~;:c evidence was heard and arguments made by both sides. 
1: 1i June 28, 1968, it was ordered that the petition for the 
·, 1 t of coram nobis be dismissed. (Ro 16). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
TI1e appellant submits that the lower court erred in 
refusiny to grant appellant a writ of coram nobis, and 
trnt the lower court's decision should be reversed and 
J writ of coram nobis be ordered to issue for a new trialo 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On the morning of November 19, 1966, at approximately 
7:30 A.M., Joe s. Valdez was driven to the dentist in Ogden, 
Utah, by a friend, Miss Shirley Wilkerson. Mr. Valdez 
-rrived '?arly and decided to go to Gus' Tavern for a 
'•"er• All of the chairs in the front of Gus' Tavern were 
'ccupied so he and Miss Wilkerson went to the rear of the 
• (T. 68-86) .. Mr. Valdez stood at the bar with Miss 
.iilkerson, since there were no chairs in the back. Next 
t.r li:e -"rpellant, at the back of the bar, was a large 
<r·ii.,n. (T. 86) 
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The same morning, Jose Don Valerio, the victim, was 
0150 
_in Gus' Tavern drinking beer. He testified at the 
triol that he had gone to Gus 1 that morning because he 
had been doing a lot of drinking the night before and that 
l~e felt bad and needed a drink to make him feel better. 
According to Valerio' s version of the story, Valdez 
w~lked up to Valerio and stabbed Valerio in the stomach 
v;ith a knife. ( T. 31). Valerio stated that there was no 
or" close to him except Valdez when the stabbing occurredo 
(T, 33). At the trial, one Rose Hewitt testified that 
sre was sitting some four or five feet away and that 
sppellant hit or punched Valerio but that at no time 
dici she see a knife used. (To 42). 
B::ith appellant and Shirley Wilkerson gave a much 
::ifferent account of the facts. According to their 
0tr;ry, Valerio came over and asked for a beer and 
'~pcllant obliged. Appellant complained that Valerio 
'-'=Pt putting his hands on him and "slobbering all over" 
rii'1 • Mr. Valdez asked Valerio to keep his hands off 
( T. 63). When Valerio kept bothering him, he pushed 
,, 1 
,. cerio into a pay phone. When Valerio car.,e right back, 
"'11.:n t hit him in the jaw knocking him down. ( T. 64, 86) • 
, iL0 r 10 fell down, the Indian also ju::-.ped on him either 
-3-
. 'blng 
'JI jJJ 
or pushing him down. (To 65) • 
No person in the bar saw the stabbing except for 
\'1krio himself. The investigating officer could find no 
ti 1 .~es of blood on the floor. ( T. 45, 46). 
After appellant's trial, and while appellant was in 
pdson, he discovered that Kelly Valdez, a distant cousin 
0: Joe s. Valdez, had visited Valeria's home after the 
stabbing, but prior to the trial. While there, Valerio 
told Kelly Valdez that he "wasn't sure who stabbed hirno" 
(R, 42). This evidence was not known by appellant's 
attorney, nor by Mro Valdez, so that it could not be used 
at the time of trial. (R. 46). There were no factors at 
the time of trial which could have connected Kelly Valdez 
to the case and warranted interviewing him. Appellant was 
in the Weber County Jail at the time Kelly Valdez and 
1lalerio had their conversation. There was no lack of 
·Jiligence on the part of appellant's attorney in failing 
10 discover this evidence at the time of trial. The 
e'1idence that was given by Kelly Valdez at the corarn 
n:::tis hearing tends to directly contradict the testimony 
0f Valerio at the trial and would create a material i.ssue 
:f fcor:t 0s to whose testimony to believe a jury would have 
' J•.cc ide. The testimony of Kelly Valdez is also consistent 
-4-
~it:i \lie testimony of Joe s. Valdez and Shirley Wilkerson, 
11
,j corroborates their testimony in a major fashion. 
At the coram nobis hearing, Shirley Wilkerson offered 
e·j.'itional testimony that she actually saw a poking motion 
nid 2 toward Valerio by the Indian after he was hit by Joe 
Vilrlez. After that motion, she saw the Indian put a knife 
in his pocket. CR. 51). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOVJER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
APPELLANT A NEW TRIAL ON A WRIT OF CORAM 
NOBIS. 
A. Nature of the Writ 
The function of the ancient writ of corarn nobis 
is to call to the attention of the trial court facts and 
circumstances outside the record which would have precluded 
er,try of the judgment had such facts been known and estab-
' 
lished cit the time of conviction. State v. Woodard, 108 Utah 
3SG, 160 P.2d 432 (1945). In In Re Dyer, 85 Cal. App. 2d 394, 
.193 P. 2d 69 (1948), the court said that the "recognized 
Present purpose /of the wri _!:7is to correct an error of fact 
wti:ri 11as unrecognized prior to the final disposition of the 
The v1ri t of coram nobis is strikingly similar to a 
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f)Hon for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered 
e•idcnce. Utah Code Annotated s 77-38-3 (1953) provides: 
"When a verdict or decision has been 
rendered against the defendant the 
court may, upon his application, grant 
a new trial in the following cases only: 
• • • 
(7) When new evidence has been discovered, 
material to e--,e defendant and which he 
could not with reasonable diligence have 
discovered ar.d produced at the trial." 
Appellant must rely on the common law writ of 
error coram nobis for a new trial, since § 77-38-4, Utah 
t 
Code Ann., (1953) sets a five day statute of limitations 
after the verdict in .,.;::Uch to make a motion for a new trial. 
Unlike the statutory ti;ie limitation of § 77-38-4, there is 
no limitation on a writ of coram nobiso See, eog., Cole 
2r1d Smiill, State Post_r--0nviction Remedies, 40 NoY.U. Lo Rev. 
154, 178-1 79 ( 1965). 
Another sirnilcrity between the writ of coram nobis 
1nd motion for a new trial is the element of newly discovered 
evidenceo In 18 Am Ju::-. 2d, Coram Nobis, s 14, P. 471, it is 
8aid: 
/ 
"A writ of co!:"c.m nobis will ordinarily not 
lie to pernit the review of a judgment for 
subsequently er newly discovered evidence 
relating to r.~tters litigated at the trial 
or going to t:-.e merits of the issues, tried 
in the court ~elow •••• 
However, the t,.;ri t may be granted where it 
-6-
cl)'f'C'ars that because of undiscovered 
rvlJcnce of such a conclusive character 
111 it if it had been introduced the ver-
cl ~, t most prolkbl y would not hove been 
-c;-~1-:;-dered, and there is a strong proba-
l)il i ty of a miscarriage of justice unless 
the writ is granted. There is also 
,'rnthori ty that coram nobis will lie where 
the defendant desires to bring some new 
fact before the court which could not have 
~een discovered by due diligence on his 
Eart in time to have been presented at 
the trial or on his motion for a new 
trial." (Emphasis added) 
E, The Conditions to be Met 
(1) Newly Discovered Evidence 
In State v. Woodard, supra, Justice Wade said: 
"It is essential to the availability of the 
remedy of coram nobis or coram vobis that 
the mistake of fact relied upon for relief 
was unknown to the applicant at the time 
of the trial, and could not by the exercise 
of reasonable diligence, have been dis-
covered by him in time to have been presented 
to the court. " 
e.:.d in Note, 8 Utah L. Rev. 362 (1963-64), it is said: 
~-
"Traditionally, a petition for a writ of 
error coram nobis requests a trial court 
to vacate its judgment because of an error 
of fact which if known at the time of trial, 
v1ould have prevented the judgment." 
The Utah Supreme Court held in Butt Vo Graham, 
2d 133, 307 P 0 2d 892 (1957), that where the record 
, :::,:::"'d that no newly discovered evidence was produced 
·"ritFJ for a writ of coram nobis that could not have 
'-1 Jij(~e:d at trial' the court properly refused to grant 
-7-
;.fit. The necessary implication from this case is that 
f ~h·"l c: wuuld have been newly discovered evidence produced 
,t the hc: . :iring which, if known at the time of trial, might 
., , prtc>cl uded entry of judgment, then the writ must be c' -
By way of analogy, the test is the same under a 
i 77-38-3, Utah Code Ann. (1953) on motion for a new trial on 
:he ·Jro1mds of newly discovered evidence.. In State v. Weaver, 
l8Utah 555, 6 P.2d 167 (1931), the court declared newly 
jfacovPrcd evidence to be that which has been brought to 
light since the lower court rendered its verdict against 
letendant. In Opie v. State, 422 P.2d 84 (Wyo. 1967), the 
:ourt held that the party seeking a new trial on the grounds 
lf ne1vly discovered evidence must satisfy the court that the 
!'1idence has come to his knowledge since trial, and that it 
I 
~as not due to a lack of diligence in discovering it. 
Kelly Valdez, a witness for defendant at the 
cor:u11 nobis hearing, testified at the coram nobis hearing to 
the w:1v evidence: 
"A. Yes, for a while. When we was leaving, that 
1Fls Miss Wilkerson, Joe's sister, and myself, Mrs• 
V:cilerio stayed right by the door, by the screen 
.Jc,ur .Jnd I stayed there talking to her. Miss 
'.!i} k•?rson and Jose Valerio' s wife, they walked 
a little ways, and me and Joe started talking, 
.:1rJ I asked him if he was sure. He says -- he 
r,:c· i ta led there for a while. He said he was not 
-8-
Not sure who stabbed him? 
A. Correct." (R. 42, lines 1 7-25) 
"0. Is there any question that this conversation 
r.:h1ally occurred after he had been stabbed? 
~.. It was after he had been stabbed. 
Q. At that time, he clearly said to you he didn't 
know who had stabbed him? 
A. He hesitated for a while, and he told me. I 
Jsked him if he was sure it was Joe and he hesitated 
tor a while. He said, 'I really don't know for sure.' 
MR. BOYCE: All right, Thank you." (R. 45, lines 
21-29). 
r:,e appeJ lant testified: 
"Q, You've f:ee.rd the conversation that Mr. Kelly 
Valdez testified to in court here today, is that right? 
A, Yes. 
Q, Were you aware of that information prior to the 
tfa,e of your trial? 
A, Didn't know anything about it. 
Q, When did you first become aware of this infor-
r·3tion? 
.t.. I think · .. :c.s not to be exact the same -- I don't 
'-'
1·:.,w the date, l:ut it was during the Catholic Men's 
Club Anniversc=ry, one of the anniversaries at the 
Si~e:le Prison. 
J, t.rid fror~. ·,::--.:::t source did you receive information 
-,_fr~<::rning th;::t fact? 
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Q. Yes. 
A. From Kelly. 
·J. And he was at the Catholic Men's Club party 
t:hat they have? 
A. Yes." (R. 46, lines 18-30, R. 47, lines 1-5). 
Appellant submits that the conversation between 
r:eny Valdez and Jose Valerio meets the test of newly dis-
,erc:d evidence. Appellant testified that he had no 
; :.+1ledge of this discussion between these witnesses until 
cfter the trial was concluded. There is no evidence to 
c:r1tradict the testimony of appellant or Kelly Valdez. 
"O. (By Mr. Boyce) Mr. Valdez, did your attorney 
knm.; anything about the possibility that Mr. Kelly 
Valdez might have this information? 
MR. GUNDRY: Objection. It•s a compounded question. 
THE COURT: Well, he can answer it, if he can. 
THE WITNESS: No, sir. 
Q. (By Mr. Boyce) You received no information? 
THE COURT: Now, that's part of the record during 
thP trial for the offense of assault with a deadly 
h'F-apon. 
MR. BOYCE: Right." (R. 47, line 30, and R. 48, 
lines 1-11). 
(2) The Evidence Must be Material 
The materiality of the newly discovered evidence 
.-_ ,J0f,c::ndant 1 s case is most frequently expressed in terms 
-10-
.. ;,, i11er:- it is sufficient to warrant a different result 
Ci 
,,n u,-t-ri.Jl. St,"'J.te v. Woodard, supra, said that the writ 
11 ". ·:\:. to obL:iin a review of a judgment on the ground that 
ccrte;: n n1j s rakes of fact have occurred which were unknown 
tn thr:o cum·t 0nd to the parties affected, and that but for 
,,,-i 1 ni~t:cikes the judgment would not have been rendered." ----
,;::si.3 supplied). 
In new trial cases under § 77-38-3, the test 
'is st.~tc:d in the same termso See e.g., State v. Weaver, 
su~ra, 1>Jhere the court said: 
T~ i .-; 
S:l, 
29 lJ. 
"To justify him in granting a new trial 
he should be satisfied that the proffered 
evidence is such as to render a different 
result probable on a retrial of the case. 
(citing cases) Or he might have granted 
it had he any reasonable doubt as to the 
guilt of the defendant. (citing cases)" 
test \·J?i s also reiterated in State v. C.Oo;eer, 114 u. 
201 P.2d 764 (1949), quoting Jensen v. Logan CitJ'.:, 
347, 57 P.2d 708 (1936): 
"It is only under very special circumstances, 
because of the quality or type of proposed 
evidence and where it makes clear a fact 
~1hich was formerly in doubt that new trials · 
··1re gr?1nted to allow the defeated party to 
?idd cur.1ulative evidence, newly discovered 
c,nd then only where there is a clear 
~r:-ob~bility that the result of a new trial 
~---· '= different." 
' :t w~s also used in State v. Sneed, 98 Ariz. 264, 
-11-
'"'. r
0
2d 816 (1965), where a state prisoner's c.rJmission that 
t,1: 1.1d ( 01nrni t ted a robbery for which the def enc ant was con-
vir:tecl wn.s newly discovered evidence which had it been admitted 
,s~ deff'ndant' s trial, would most probably have changed the 
vr-:-dict • 
In State v. Fowler, 101 Ariz. 561, 422 P.2d 125 
(1967), the defendant asserted that he was attacked by the 
decrdent, und that he had shot in self-defense; that decedent 
hc:d had a reputation for carrying a knife; that the police 
had dj scovered a knife within a short time after the shooting 
riear the scene of the crime. But the prosectuion concealed 
frisfact and brought it to the jury's attention that there 
wa< no evidence that decedent was carrying a knife at the 
tLrr·: of the shooting. The court there held that defendant 
i1os denied due process and a new trial was required because 
I 
of the newly discovered evidence. 
The "different results" test is also followed 
in 3tc;te v 
I - • 
Wright, 5 Ariz. App. 357' 427 p .2d 338 (1967); 
~e v. In'.l, 55 Cal Rptr. 902, 422 P. 2d 590 (1967); 
t'H0r, v. --- Peoi:'.le, 114 Colo. 534, 168 P.2d 266 (1946); 
Shi" , . ~':.'.~}le, 82 Idao 4 7' 349 P.2d 114 (1960); 
~· Stute, 81 Nev. 639, 408 P.2d 715 (1965); and 
.~t:__~_~, supra, 422 P. 2d 84 (Wyo. 1967). 
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The facts in appellant's case are most material 
,, it;c issue of who actually stabbed Jose Valerio. In 
11 ,1 2riJ's ovm \Jords, he "didn't know". The evidence given 
1' l' ,, V-=ilclc'z at the corarn nobis hearing tends to raise a h r,e 1-1 
~,,c·[ial question of fact for a jury to decide: Did Joe s. 
~':l~c-·.3 .:cch1iJ.lly stab Jose Valerio, or did Jose Valerio only 
Vctldcz w0s the one who stabbed him'? Appellant submits 
t~e:;t this conflicting testimony of Kelly Valdez and Shirley 
\.:ii:~erson, as opposed to Jose Valerio, is within the 
11,]iffen·nt results" test. A jury could reasonably reach a 
di'ferent vRrdict based on this new evidenceo 
When there is a reasonable doubt as to defend-
a:1t's guilt, State v. Weaver, supra, and State v. Woodard, 
supra, is even stronger in favor of defendanto There is a 
i''=·'..'nrible doubt in_ appellant's case, and this doubt 
ccuplPd vii th the additional facts discovered since the 
tcidl cidd to the materiality of the issue to be put before 
6 ju1 Y. This reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt is 
illustra:~E:d by Shirley Wilkerson's testimony: 
"MR. BOYCE: It is material, Your Honor. It's 
sdditlon"11 evidence. I indicated in my opening 
c.tatrcrnent that I believed that I could present 
r,·1id":'.r1ce as to someone who acturilly saw a knife 
':rrJ I intend to do that. 
THE COURT:· Objection overruled. 
-13-
u. ( l3y Mr. Boyce) Would you please answer the 
tlie question? 
A. Well, I saw the Indian put the knife in his 
pc•:ket. 
Q. You saw the Indian, who I referred to in my 
opening statement, who was standing at the bar? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what did you see him do? 
A. Well, he also hit the man beside Joe. 
Q. And then what did you see happen1 
A. He stuck a knife in his pocket real fast. The 
police didn't search him. 
Q. All right, then, you saw a knife in the possession 
of that large Indian fellow on that day? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that knife, you saw on his possession shortly 
after Mr. Valdez struck Mr. Valerio? 
A. Yes." (R. 51, lines 9-29) 
The newly discovered evidence also makes clear 
0 fact which was formerly in doubt, State Vo Cooper, supra: 
"h:::t question which has already been stated - did Joe s. 
Valc]Pz stab Jose Valerio? The newly discovered evidence 
r-Jirits to a result opposite to that found in the trial 
c:,:nt bf~low. This fact was never really clear in the original 
t;i)], Joe s. Valdez was convicted on the testimony of Jose 
:IT-,),._..• 
_,~, l''• th,:it appellant was the one who had stabbed him. But 
' c \'i<J, ·nc(' discovered since the trial shows two persons 
-14-
.J cot ioburate appellant's testimony, and further, refute 
· i,:ri..u':;. The testimony of Kelly Valdez and Shirley 
, ___ 1 ,cnn demonstrate that appellant did not stab Valerio, 
_.;t instC'ad only struck him with his fist after provocation. 
Appellant has met the test required for the 
' - c:nting of a writ of coram nobis on the grounds of newly 
:i;:covcred evidence. He was without knowledge of these 
~::itional facts at the time of trial. He could not have, 
.. ~th reasonable diligence, discovered these facts. The 
2.idence did not come to his attention until after he was 
:onvicted and committed to the State Prison. 
The newly discovered evidence is material to 
dendant 's case since it makes clear a fact which was 
:ornerly in doubt. The new evidence raises a reasonable 
~: 1ibt as to defendant's guilt. Finally, a jury could very 
::cb:.bly reach a different result with the aid of this newly 
:~::=o·:e:red evidence on retrial. 
c. Th_e Jury Function in Coram Nobis 
In Ward v. Turner, 12 Utah 2d 310, 366 P.2d 72 (1961), 
. i~ court said: 
"In order to justify a release of a convicted 
p•Json under a writ of habec:s corpus or coram 
nobis, or other special writ, the evidence 
of his innocence must be stronger than would 
bp necessary in the first·instance in support 
c,f a rrntion for a new trial, for such special 
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writs are arrlied for after the defendant's 
conviction h=s been affirmed or dcriied on 
nppeal, and in a sense they invade the 
usual rules for the finality of judgments. 
The most that can be said for this appli-
cation for a special writ is that had the 
evidence been promptly disclosed it might 
have justified the granting of a new trial. 
In order to sustain the granting of a 
special writ in a case like this, some-
thing more is required than merely that 
the evidence ::-.ight have justified the 
granting of a new trial had it been 
promptly disclosed." 
Jn that case, appellant sought a special writ on 
, the: ground that the p:ccsecution knowingly used perjured 
t2stirnony of a doctor who had examined a woman who had 
1 
been victim of an alle;ed raping. After appellant's con-
viclion, new evidence cisclosed that the doctor had found 
that the woman had hc.C. sodomy cornrni tted upon her, and not 
rape:. Further, in a r;sychiatric examination of appellant 
d·1riny the course of ce trial below, it was found that he 
did not have deviate te!!dencies of the type required to 
have committed sodomy instead of rape. 
) . 
Appellant cc~~ends that the court in that case 
st.cited too strict a t'::st for a special writ to issue. 
[,). d ~ v. Turner cannot 'Ce used as stare decisis in appellant's 
~-':.:c:. The court was e:-:z.::::iating a very strict decision upon 
1-.'r.c. 
c • nrirrow issue in C--.=t case only. The question there was 
'Lh,,r tl1·~ newly dis::::.:;·.'ered evidence was of a sufficient 
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;urc tkit a new jury could have believed a reversal 
.. -:;s:-;dLY and on that narrow question of fact the court 
,.,iJ "no". Further, on collateral review, the United States 
('·Jrt nf Apperils, Tenth Circuit granted relief from the 
Turner Vo Ward, 321 F. 2d 918 (10th Cir. 1963). 
The law is generally in opposition to that narrow 
in \·J,1rd Vo Turner, supra. Appellant can find no 
:ti1er authority which sets such constraints as the test for 
u'lief. Generally stated, other authorities have taken an 
: o,.pusite vie\·J. The rule has been stated as whether the 
r:r•uld reasonably find a different verdict on re-trial 
cec;;u.se of the weight of the newly discovr-"red evidence when 
ciomined in the light of all of the other evidence presented 
':[ ;n the original trial. The function of the jury is to 
the factual issues in a case. In order to do this, 
·ust he aided by the use of every fact which bears 
on IJ1 1e> g11il t or innocence of the defendant. It is not 
~L,orial v1hether the judge sitting at a coram nobis petition 
'i.r11 believes the testimony of a witness whose testimony 
l-.c:·ring upon the new evidence, in this case, Kelly Valdez. 
1
': i: <lo'Os rni:! tter whether a jury could reasonably believe 
'
111Lility of the testimony of Kelly Valdez. 
fn T1Jrner v. Ward, 321 F. 2d 918 (10th Cir. 1963), 
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.. _uurt ]Jc] icved that the materiality of the perjured 
rll'IOllY of the doctor was of such weight that the jury 
;lcl have probably reached a different verdict, and 
:finned the Utah Federal District Court's grant of a 
~,1ition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court said, in 
51 ,1king of the effect of the testimony upon the jury in 
"Such testimony clearly left the inference 
with the jury that the crime of rape had 
been corrunitted, which was contrary to the 
opinion of the doctor, and withheld from 
the jury his true opinion." 
CONCLUSION 
App~llant submits that the testimony of Kelly Valdez 
c.c,.j Shirley Wilkerson, when compared with that of Jose 
\'3lerio is of such nature that it would have the distinct 
1 ~~~=r:t upon a different jury of causing them to reach a 
·c:.::lict different from that reached in the first instanceo 
!. ''='·: jury ought to have the duty of weighing the credi-
'=~lity of the opposing testimony. A new jury ought to 
: '·" the res pons ibili ty of determining Joe S. Valdez' 
:~~~ t in light of the weight of this newly discovered 
~cse facts weigh heavily in favor of a new trial 
rlt of error coram nobis: 
'-
0 T'!i.·11 there was no blood found '1t the scene of 
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? • Th,:it no knife or similar weapon was found. 
~c Thdt there was an Indian standing nearby who 
4. That this Indian made a "stabbing motion" towards 
. lffiO. 
5. That Valerio had been drinking heavily the night 
, ·::·ere the fight, as well as that morning. 
6. That Joe s. Valdez struck Valerio with a blow 
."Jfficient to confuse Valerio' s mind. 
7. That Valerio said to Kelly Valdez that he "didn't 
~:,oh' ' 1,·ho had stabbed him. 
8. That Joe s. Valdez had no knowledge or possi-
cility of knowing of this evidence until after the trial 
~el ow. 
If taken individually, as in Ward v. Turner, supra, 
~.c:ce facts v1ould admittedly be insufficient to warrant 
0 jury finding a different result on re-trial. But in 
;::-~ totality of the circurristances, when weighed together, 
" '--'.:'] have a commanding effect to the point that a new 
'o>:y 1:1'.)1Jld rnost probably reach a different resul to For 
JS u~a:~cm, appellant is entitled to a writ of error 
-19-
'_ 1 ~ 11 nobis for the purpose of a. new trial 0 lC -
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